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Habeas Corpus - Extradition Cases
When the Constitution of the United States was adopted, it pro-
vided that:
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime who
shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the
executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up to be re-
moved to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.1
By this clause, the power to regulate interstate extradition is dele-
gated to the Federal Government, and in pursuance thereof, laws
of Congress have been passed specifying the judicial acts which
are necessary to authorize a demand, such as the production of a
copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magis-
trate of any state or territory charging the person so demanded
with having committed a crime, and making the certificate of the
executive authority conclusive as to verity when presented to the
executive of the state wherein the fugitive is found. 2 But the gov-
ernor of the asylum state may not legally be compelled to deliver
up an accused; his duty has been held to be a mere moral obli-
gation. 3
In order to facilitate the procedure, thirty states have passed
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.4 Under this act, the accused
need not be a fugitive from justice in the demanding state,- and
this has been held to be constitutional, 6 although the Federal Con-
stitution and the Congressional statutes provide only for the rendi-
tion of fugitives.
Section 10 of the Uniform Act provides that:
If the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the
legality of his arrest, the judge shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him
within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus.
This comment is concerned with the extent of the court's inquiry
in the consideration of an application for habeas corpus; by one
under arrest under a warrant of the governor of the state in which
he was arrested, in compliance with a request for interstate rendi-
tion made by the governor of another state in which the prisoner
allegedly committed a crime. The writ will test the validity of the
detention only, and thus the sole question for determination is
whether or not the prisoner is subject to interstate rendition.
U.S. CONST. ART. IV §2.
2 RHv. STAT. §5278 (1878), 18 U.S.C. §3182 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
'Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860).
'Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Del., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Mont., Nebr., N.H., N.Mex., NY., N.Car., Ohio, Ore., Penna., S.Dak.,
Utah, Vt., W.Va., Wis., Wyo.
UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT §6; But see §2.
English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E. 2d 898 (1947).
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Under the Constitution7 and the pursuant federal statute," a pris-
oner, arrested under warrant of extradition, must be: (1) substan-
tially charged with a crime under the criminal laws of the demand-
ing state.9 It has been established that the word "crime" in the
Constitutional provision for extradition of fugitives from justice
as between states, embraces every act forbidden and made punish-
able by a law of the demanding state including misdemeanors; (2)
a fugitive from justice, and this has been determined to mean that
he must have been in the demanding state at the time the criminal
act charged was committed and subsequently have left that state
for any purpose; ' (3) the person charged with a crime and indi-
cated by the warrant. This is to be distinguished from the question
of whether or not he is the person who committed the crime. This
latter determination is for the trial court of the demanding state;
(4) arrested under a warrant regular on its face. This last require-
ment is common to all arrests and, therefore, will not be discussed
in this comment.
The governor of the state of asylum must in his determination
of the issuance of a warrant consider all of these factors, and they
are the points of inquiry open to investigation by the court on a
writ of habeas corpus. The action of the governor is presumed to
be lawful, however, and the burden of proof of any defect in the
issuance of the warrant is therefore on the prisoner."
CHARGE OF A CRIME
The obligation to surrender depends upon the criminal law of
the demanding state and not the law of the state of asylum. 12 The
governor of the asylum state having determined in the first instance
that the indictment or affidavit submitted to him with the requi-
sition of the governor of the demanding state, and certified by the
latter as authentic, contains a substantial charge of a crime, and
having issued his warrant for the arrest of the fugitive, the person
arrested may have such determination reviewed on habeas corpus.1
Upon such review the executive warrant, if in due form, is prima
facie proof that a crime has been charged. The presumption thus
prevailing is not conclusive, and the governor's warrant for rendi-
tion is subject to judicial review. If it were otherwise, say the
courts, the governor would be clothed with arbitrary and despotic
7 U.S. CONsT. ART. IV §2.
Rsv. STAT. §5278 (1878), 18 U.S.C. §3182 (Cong. Serv. 1948).
Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914).
"Contra: UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT §6.
Chase v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 173 So. 103 (1927); See note, 54 A.L.R. 271
(1928).
'Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1921).
'Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908).
19491 COMMENTS 363
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
power, and there would be no uniform action in such matters in the
various states.14 Whether the accused is charged with a crime is a
jurisdictional question and always open to judicial inquiry.15
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
Except under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act or where
otherwise provided by statute, the prisoner must be a fugitive from
justice in the demanding state. Here again a warrant is presump-
tive, but not conclusive, evidence that the prisoner is a fugitive
from justice, 6 but is rebuttable in habeas corpus proceedings.'
Whether or not the prisoner is a fugitive is a question of fact. 8 If
it is clearly shown that he was not within the demanding state when
the crime was alleged to have been committed and his extradition
is sought on the ground of constructive presence only, the court will
ordinarily discharge the prisoner. 9 Mere absence from the scene
of the crime, by way of alibi, may not be shown unless probative of
the fact that the accused is not a fugitive.2 0 It is, in general, the
duty of the governor where requisition is made for the extradition
of an alleged fugitive from justice to determine, in the first in-
stance, whether such person is in fact a fugitive within the mean-
ing of the extradition laws. While there have been some doubts
expressed as to the power of the courts to review such determina-
tion,21 courts have generally held it not to be conclusive. 22 The
decided weight of authority is to the effect that the mission, motive,
or purpose inducing a person accused of being a fugitive to leave
the demanding state is immaterial.23 The prisoner need not have
known that he had committed a crime when he left the state.2 4
Some few courts hold contra.25 The minority holdings are on the
basis of the voluntary nature of departure. But a prisoner who
has been removed from the demanding state by federal authorities
' 
4 Ex parte Owen, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 284, 136 Pac. 197 (1913).
"Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
M cNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100 (1907).
Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1902), In re Hubbard, 201 N.C. 472,
160 S.E. 569 (1931); See note, 81 A.L.R. 547.
'Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1932), Contra: UNIFORM CRMI-
INAL ExTRADITION ACT §6.
1 State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N.E. 2d 144 (1937) ; See
note, 114 A.L.R. 686.
2Appleyard v. Mass., 203 U.S. 222 (1906), Biddinger v. Police Comr., 245
U.S. 128 (1917).
'Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa 106, 32 Am. Rep. 116 (1878), People ex rel.
Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N.Y. 176, 64 N.E. 825 (1902), Aff'd 188 U.S. 691 (1902).
1 Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52 (1921), Drew v. Thaw 235 U.S. 432 (1914).
'Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885), Biddinger v. Police Comr., 245 U.S.
128 (1917).
'See note 13 A.L.R. 415, 420.
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is nevertheless a fugitive from justice in an asylum state.2 Depart-
ure from a jurisdiction after the commission of an act in further-
ance of a crime subsequently consummated is a flight from justice
and renders the fugitive liable to extradition.
2 7
The accused must produce "conclusive" proof that he was not
in the demanding state.23 In some jurisdictions the proof need only
be "clear and convincing," 2 in others it must be beyond a "reason-
able doubt,"' "or substantial and convincing," 31 but the conclusive
proof test is the desirable one, '2 for the accused need only raise a
reasonable doubt, at the trial, in the demanding state.
A state may in the exercise of its reserved sovereign powers and
as an act of comity to a sister state, provide by statute for surren-
der, on requisition, of persons who are indictable for a crime com-
mitted through their constructive presence, even though they have
never been corporeally within such state and have never fled there-
from to escape arrest or punishment.3 In the absence of a statute,
a state may not render a person unless he is a fugitive.3
4
Where a man has contributed to the support of his wife and
children at all times before leaving the state but stops payments
after he leaves, he is not a fugitive." Due to the continuing nature
of the crime of abandonment or nonsupport of a wife or children,
an exception has been established to the majority rule that one
must be in the state when the crime is committed. It is to the effect
that the temporary presence within the state, although for an
innocent purpose, of one charged with neglect to support his wife
and children is sufficient to charge him with being a fugitive from
justice upon his departure again from the demanding state.8
An accused person arrested in interstate proceedings, who sues
out habeas corpus to obtain his discharge on the ground that he is
not a fugitive from justice, is not entitled to introduce evidence to
prove that after the date of the alleged offense he was "usually and
publicly resident" within the demanding state for a time sufficient
to bar the prosecution under its limitation statutes. The statute of
' State ex rel. Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N.W. 811 (1932), See
note 85 A.L.R. 114.
-Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1910).
'Ex parte Rabinowitz, 65 P. 2d 1236 (Okla. Cr. App. 1937).
'McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100 (1907).
a' South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933).
State v. Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S.W. 2d 612 (1928).
-22 TKINN. L. Ray. 431 (1937).
3UNIFORM CRimINAL ExTRADrioN Acr §6, State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 705, 20
S.E. 729 (1894).
U.S. CONST. ART. IV §2.
"Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 Atl. 644 (1927), Chase v. Florida, 93 Fla.
963, 113 So. 103 (1927).
1 Chase v. Florida, supra note 35.
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limitations is a defense and must be asserted on the trial by the
defendant in criminal cases; matters of defense can not be heard
on habeas corpus to test the validity of an arrest in extradition,
but must be heard and decided at the trial, by the courts of the
demanding state.3 7
IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED
The determination of the fact of identity of the person arrested
as the person named in the executive warrant is always open to
judicial inquiry.38 The burden of proving the identity of the pris-
oner rests on those seeking his extradition when he denies on
habeas corpus that he is the person for whom the warrant was
issued.39 A prima facie case is made out by the state, however, if it
shows that the name of the prisoner and the name set forth in the
warrant are identical. 40
MOTIVE OR ULTERIOR PURPOSE OF OFFICIALS
As a general rule, the courts on habeas corpus will not inquire
into motives which induced a governor to honor or refuse q requi-
sition, since such an inquiry would be opposed both to the plainest
principles of public policy and to the freedom of action by the
executive within his constitutional authority.41
The reasons given for the majority rule are: (1) executive
discretion is not subject to court review ;412 (2) the matter of motive
is one of defense cognizable solely in the courts of the demanding
state; (3) if the prisoner is guilty of the offense it is no defense
for him to allege improper motive.43 On the other hand, some courts
assert that under some circumstances the motive which lies behind
an extradition request may be a matter for consideration of the
court under habeas corpus. It is necessary for the demanding state
to show that requisition is for the purpose of subjecting the pris-
oner to prosecution for the offense charged, and not merely to sub-
verse private malice or to obtain service on him for some other
purpose.4 4 The rule in Oklahoma is that in every extradition case
the question of good faith of both the demanding and rendering
Biddinger v. Police Comr., 245 U.S. 128 (1917).
Lee Gim Bor v. Ferrari, 55 F. 2d 86 (1st Cir. 1932); See note, 84 A.L.R.
329; UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT §20.
Barnes v. Nelson, 23 S.D. 181, 121 N.W. 89 (1909); See note, 84 A.LR.
339; Huie Fong v. Bligh 55 F. 2d 189 (1st Cir. 1932); See note, 84 A.L.R. 341.
"0 State ex rel. Grande v. Bates, 101 Minn. 303, 112 N.W. 260 (1907); See
note, 84 A.L.R. 341.
Collins v. Traeger, 27 F. 2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928).
Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N.C. 85, 20 S.E. 188 (1894).
Flower v. Superintendent of Phil. County Prison, 220 Pa. 401, 69 Atl.
916 (1908).
"In re Bruchman, 28 N.D. 358, 148 N.W. 1052 (1914).
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state is open to inquiry on habeas corpus.45
In Ohio, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradi-
tion Act, there was a statute providing that the demand for extra-
dition must be made in good faith for the punishment of crime and
not for the purpose of the collection of a debt or to remove the al-
leged fugitive to a foreign jurisdiction to serve him with civil
process.4 6 A Pennsylvania court released a Negro boy because of
the strong possibility of his being lynched or otherwise deprived
of a fair trial.-7 Courts had previously held that the danger of
being lynched is not sufficient reason for refusing to extradite the
fugitive.41 In habeas corpus the limitation of inquiry is as to juris-
diction but it has been held that a possibility of a sufficient denial
of due process is jurisdictional. 41
CONCLUSION
The necessity for extradition procedure arose out of the demand
on the part of the states that their sovereign powers be maintained.
The Extradition Clause of the Federal Constitution" is a grant by
the states of power to the Federal Government to control extradi-
tion. Since the adoption of the Constitution the states have seen
fit to relinquish even more of their sovereign power by passing
statutes which let down some of the barriers encountered in at-
tempting to arrest a person who has committed a crime against
the demanding state and who is, at the time of the requisition for
extradition, within the boundaries of another state.
Attempts have been made to eliminate the problem. The Fugi-
tive Felon Act 51 makes it a crime to flee from the jurisdiction of a
'Ex parte Offutt, 29 Okla. Crim. Rep. 401, 234 Pac. 222 (1925).
"it re Williams, 5 Ohio App. 55 (1915).
M attox v. Superintendent of Prisons, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. 2d 576
(1943), 53 YALE L. J. 359 (1943).
" Ople v. Weinbrenner, 285 Mo. 365, 226 S.W. 256 (1920), cert. denied,
256 U.S. 695 (1921).
'Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
U.S. CONST. ART. IV §2.
18 U.S.C. §1073 (Cong. Serv. 1948): "Whoever moves or travels in inter-
state or foreign commerce with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or
custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place from
which he flees, for murder, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, mayhem, rape,
assault with a dangerous weapon, or extortion accompanied by threats of vio-
lence, or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses as they are defined
either at common law or by the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees,
or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in such place in
which the commission of an offense punishable by imprisonment in a peniten-
tiary is charged, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
"Violations of this section may be prosecuted only in the federal judicial
district in which the original crime was alleged to have been commited or in
which the person was held in custody or confinement."
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state to avoid prosecution for certain enumerated crimes. A fugi-
tive arrested for the violation of the act may after his arrest apply
for a writ of habeas corpus. The court in consideration of his ap-
plication may consider only two things: (1) the identity of the
prisoner, and (2) the regularity of the warrant.5 2 The questions
of whether or not he is a fugitive and whether he fled to avoid
prosecution for a crime are elements of the crime defined by the
act and must be tried in the district in which the original crime is
alleged to have been committed. To charge a violation of this act it
is only necessary to charge that the accused left a state with the
intent to avoid prosecution for one of the enumerated crimes. 3 The
purpose of this act is to make it unnecessary to extradite a person
who may be brought within the purview of the statute.5 4 The act
provides no immunity from criminal or civil process and a fugitive
returned under the act is, therefore, subject to indictment for the
original crime.55 This statute does not cure the difficulty in the
case of a crime not enumerated in the act and does not cover those
crimes committed by constructive presence. The Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act takes care of the constructive presence problem
but extradition, at best, is a cumbersome process and depends on
the efficiency of the police of the state of asylum for its success.
There is no good reason why a person should be able to commit
a crime and then hide behind the sovereign skirts of an asylum
state. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to make extradition
between the states as simple as arrest and removal where a person
has committed a crime in another county of the same state.
The only danger of such simplified procedure is that an innocent
person might be caused some inconvenience. It has been pointed out,
by those who would retain strict rules of extradition, that some
person wishing to obtain personal service on another who was im-
mune from civil process in the home state of the first person, might
"trump" up a criminal charge in order to have his adversary
Barrow v. Owen, 89 F. 2d 476 (5th Cir. 1937).
'Jackson v. .S., 131 F. 2d 606 (8th Cir. 1942).
Report No. 1458 of the House Committee on the Judiciary May 3, 1934,
73rd Congress, 2d Session: "One of the most difficult problems which local
law-enforcement agencies have to deal with today is the ease with which
criminals are able to flee from the state to avoid prosecution, and witnesses
leave the state to avoid giving testimony in criminal proceedings. The above
bill is considered the most satisfactory solution of this problem, which the
states have never been able to solve effectively. This bill will not prevent the
states from obtaining extradition of roving criminals, but the complicated
process of extradition has proved to be very inefficient. The ability of federal
officers to follow a criminal from one state to any other state or states, as
provided in the above bill, should furnish the desired relief from this class of
law evaders."
U.S. v. Conley, 80 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1948).
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brought within the accuser's state. To this argument it might, in
the first place, be answered that the justice of the present lack of
e.traterritorial personal service in civil suits is doubtful. A better
answer is the use, in connection with a simple extradation pro-
cedure, of the safeguard employed in the Ohio extradition statute. 6
This would afford sufficient immunity to civil process to eliminate
the so-called danger. Beyond such a safeguard the accused has
remedies at law to combat malicious prosecution and false arrest.
The only questions that need be decided on habeas corpus are
the identity of the accused and the sufficiency of the warrant. If
the accused is guilty of a crime in the demanding state it seems
unnecessary to consider the question, eliminated by the Uniform
Act, of whether or not the prisoner is a fugitive. Since the criminal
law of the demanding state is controlling, it would seem desirable
to permit the courts of that state to determine whether or not a
crime is charged.
John G. McCune
r OHIO GEN CODE §109-25: "A person brought into this state by or after
waiver of, extradition based on a criminal charge shall not be subject to service
of personal process in any civil action in this state until he has been convicted
in the criminal proceedings, or if acquitted, until he has had reasonable opppor-
tunity to return to the state from which he was extradited."
Under the Uniform Act in most states it is provided that the immunity
from civil process appllies only to civil actions arising out of the same facts
as the criminal proceeding which he is being or has been returned to answer.
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